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Fire investigation has generally concentrated on determination of the cause and origin of a fire. Methodologies
developed for this purpose have thus focused on the dynamics of fire growth and investigation of its effect on
different objects within the structure affected by the fire. It is unusual to see a fire investigation emphasising
structural damage as a way to obtain information for fire reconstruction. The series of dramatic fire events that
occurred on 11 September 2001 within the World Trade Center, New York complex have emphasised the need to
introduce structural analysis as a companion to evaluation of a fire timeline. Only a combined analysis is capable of
providing a complete reconstruction of the event and therefore a solid determination of causality. This paper presents
a methodology to establish, by means of modern structural and fire analysis tools, the sequence of events leading to a
structural failure. This analysis will be compared with classic cause and origin techniques, emphasising the importance
of a comprehensive study. Specific structural features and fire conditions that lead to unique forms of failure will be
discussed, establishing the complexity of linking fire, structure characteristics and failure mode. The collapse of
buildings 1 and 2 of the World Trade Center will be used to illustrate different forms of failure and the fires that cause
them.
1. Introduction
The collapse of buildings 1 and 2 of the World Trade Center
(WTC) represents one of the major structural failures of
modern construction and has thus been the subject of a notable
fire investigation – first by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA, 2002) and then by the
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
(Sunder et al., 2006). Several other studies have been reported
in the literature, the most relevant to this paper being those by
Quintiere et al. (2002) and Usmani et al. (2003). These
investigations clearly indicate that the failures originated from
the interactions between unique structural forms and the fires.
Many factors, such as structural damage, removal of insulating
material and aircraft fuel, accelerated the collapse but none of
these factors triggered the progressive collapse. Furthermore, it
has been shown that other structural systems under more
severe fire conditions will not result in similar failures (Usmani
and Lamont, 2004). While many claim that the number of
independent investigations and the funding devoted to the
forensic analysis were too small and not consistent with the
magnitude of the event, it is clear that the investigations cited
above are comprehensive in nature and cover great detail and
breadth. The present work therefore does not aim to add to
these studies or to provide new information or theories;
instead, it focuses on putting the investigation of the WTC
collapses in the context of a methodology that enables the
investigation of complex failures.
2. Fire investigation
The process of investigating a fire starts with site analysis. The
site analysis methodology has been the subject of many books
(e.g. DeHaan and Icove, 2003) and standards (NFPA, 2007).
These treatises present a detailed description of how evidence
should be gathered, arranged and saved so that the legal
process that follows an investigation can make proper use of
the evidence. Recommendations on what typical patterns are
to be further analysed (fire patterns, pour patterns, etc.) are
presented with a number of suggested interpretations.
Although the suggested interpretations tend to be useful to
the expert eye, in many cases they can be misleading. The main
reason for this is that many paths can lead to the same
outcome. This is especially true in fire investigation where
scientists, engineers or investigators have to work mostly with
debris or the building needs to be rapidly demolished. The case
of the WTC buildings is a perfect example of this situation. As
described in the official reports (FEMA, 2002; Sunder et al.,
2006), the debris of the WTC buildings was dug out of the site
and rapidly disposed of; investigators thus had only a short
period of time to extract as much information as possible from
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the debris. A further complexity of the WTC fire scene was the
size of the collapse. In a collapse of that magnitude,
identification of pre-collapse damage from collapse-induced
damage is very difficult. Furthermore, repositioning the debris
to its original location represented an insurmountable chal-
lenge, and only a very limited number of debris elements could
be placed in their original locations (FEMA, 2002).
The process of a fire investigation results in the collection of a
finite number of evidence elements. These could be remnants of
the building, images or testimonies. The NIST report (Sunder
et al., 2006) provides what is probably the most comprehensive
collection of images and testimonies ever collected for a fire
investigation. The evidence allows a finite series of events to be
established but does not tell the story of the failure. Different
techniques have been developed to link finite evidence points in
a manner such that a story can be told. Brannigan and Torero
(1999) presented a geometric analogy to describe this process
(Figure 1(a)). The points represent the evidence and the
geometric figures the potential scenarios.
The most conventional of these techniques is generally called
‘cause and origin’ in the investigation community. During a
cause and origin analysis, a fire investigator will attempt to
interpret the evidence in a way that establishes how the fire
started (origin) and what caused it (cause). This technique has
been used for many years and has proven to be adequate for
simple fires where fire safety engineering techniques have not
been implemented. A different approach is ‘fire reconstruc-
tion’. This technique uses understanding of the science under-
pinning fire and structural behaviour to establish which of the
paths (geometrical shapes) corresponds to the unique repre-
sentation of the scenario. This implies an understanding of
how the damage originated and how the fire safety systems
performed. Fire reconstruction is a more suitable technique for
modern buildings.
Cause and origin analysis has been well documented (DeHaan
and Icove, 2003; NFPA, 2007) and consists mainly of rigorous
gathering of evidence and simple interpretation of this
information. Fire dynamic techniques (Drysdale, 1999) need
to be used in many cases to validate theories and establish a
single pattern for the scenario (Figure 1(b)). Nevertheless,
these techniques tend to be a very simple set of physical
equations and empirical correlations. Detailed analytical
techniques have also been employed in the past to establish
chemical compositions (i.e. for identification of hydrocarbons)
(DeHaan and Icove, 2003) or to define if certain components,
such as smoke detectors, have operated or not (Worrell et al.,
2001). Only recently have complex numerical models been used
to support cause and origin analysis (McGrattan, 2004;
Olenick and Carpenter, 2003; Sunder et al., 2006).
When the scenario is as complex as the WTC collapses, fire
reconstruction techniques involve the use of numerous
methodologies. Parametric analysis of the potential conditions
experienced during the event represents a useful way to try to
identify similarities between the response of the building and
specific conditions. These techniques were used by Usmani
et al. (2003). A different approach is to attempt to model the
different components of the event (i.e. fires, heat transfer,
structural behaviour, etc.). For this purpose, simple empirical
correlations or analytical models can be used. However, while
they provide useful information, they are not able to describe
many of the details that enable a reconstruction of the events.
Torero et al. (2002) tried to eliminate some flawed hypotheses
associated with the nature of the fires in the WTC by using
simple analytical formulations and empirical data. NIST
(Sunder et al., 2006) used complex computational fluid
dynamics (CFD) models to link discrete images and to provide
a description of the fire propagation. Furthermore, the model
allowed defining the heat release rates of the fires. Validation
of these heat release rates was obtained by combining weather
information of the day with images of the smoke plume and the
model output. At the structural level, both NIST (Sunder et al.,
2006) and Usmani et al. (2003) used complex finite-element
models (FEMs) to describe the evolution in time of the
deformations and the ultimate collapse. Quintiere et al. (2002)
used analytical expressions to describe the structural beha-
viour. In the NIST report (Sunder et al., 2006) the predicted
deformations are qualitatively compared to photographic
evidence validating the sequence of collapse. In general, there
is consistency between the NIST report (Sunder et al., 2006)
and the work of Usmani et al. (2003). Quintiere et al. (2002)
reached mostly the same conclusions obtained in a qualitative
(a) (b)
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the process of fire investigation.
(a) The dots represent discrete points of evidence while the shapes
all possible scenarios that fit the evidence. (b) The arrows represent
the interpretation that allows one to eliminate all shapes and
reduce the scenarios to a single one (circle)
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manner by the FEMA investigation (FEMA, 2002); these
conclusions were shown to be incomplete by the two other
studies.
An added complication originates from the fact that most
modern buildings require the use of different fire safety
measures. These can include detection and alarm, active fire
suppression, smoke management techniques, compartmentation
and passive fire proofing. These techniques allow rapid egress of
occupants, control or deceleration of fire growth, management
of smoke migration and protection of the structure. If these
measures operate adequately, then the fire will be controlled in a
restricted location and a simple cause and origin analysis will
suffice. If the fire continues to grow, resulting in significant
damage, then the different protective measures would have not
performed adequately and a fire reconstruction will be
necessary. The mechanisms by which these systems can fail
represent the inherent weaknesses of the infrastructure (Torero,
2006). Fire reconstruction analysis will establish the perfor-
mance of each safety component as well as the performance of
the structure and its occupants. In an ideal scenario, a fire
reconstruction could result in an artificial recreation of the
events.
In the WTC, it was established very early on that water-based
fire suppression systems did not work due to the aircraft-
induced damage. This simplifies the investigation by eliminating
a component of the analysis. Nevertheless, the failure of
compartmentation and fire proofing induced by the aircraft
impact required an impact analysis of dramatic complexity
(Sunder et al., 2006). The impact analysis allowed determination
of the nature of the damage and its implications on the fire safety
strategy. To achieve the impact analysis it was necessary to build
a detailed model of the building and the aircraft. The model
described the damage to the exterior columns, which could be
compared with photographic evidence, giving confidence in the
model and allowing its use to describe interior damage. The
NIST report concludes that while damage to the external
columns was extensive it did not lead to global collapse nor did it
significantly breach the compartmentation provided by the
floors. Thus the fire spread only within the region where there
was significant damage and did not continue to spread
vertically. Instead, damage to the internal core columns and
partitions compromised egress paths, resulting in a reduced
capability for people above the fire to exit the building. The
NIST report emphasises that the aircraft impact stripped out
large sections of fire proofing. While this is highly probable, the
amount of stripped insulation and its impact on the nature of the
ultimate failure remain a matter of controversy.
Currently there are no well-defined methodologies for fire
reconstruction. As mentioned earlier, evidence collection does
not provide sufficient information to define the progress of a fire
and its impact on people and structures, and thus there is a need
to have clearly defined techniques to combine evidence and
engineering models to support investigation. The WTC inves-
tigations have shown the lack of maturity of this field.
Investigators improvised the methodologies used, making
planning for evidence collection and analysis difficult. In more
than one instance the analysis remained inconclusive due to the
absence of evidence that potentially existed but had already been
disposed of. Massive amounts of evidence were collected for the
WTC investigation, but a conclusive reconstruction of the fire
timeline that led to the collapse was not achieved. In this case,
state-of-the-art fire and structural models were deployed, but
the absence of a rigorous method hampered the investigation.
This paper presents a methodology to analyse the failure of a
structure due to fire. A description of existing tools and the
ways in which they can be used is presented.
3. Methodology
The methodology described in this study was applied to the
WTC study conducted by Usmani et al. (2003); details of the
specific analyses can be found in this reference but the
methodology is presented only in an implicit manner. In the
following sections, highlights of this application will be used to
illustrate in detail the methodology followed. Emphasis is put
on the method not on the detailed analyses.
A complex forensic investigation needs to start by defining the
objectives of the study. Without clear objectives it is difficult to
reach conclusions. Usmani et al. (2003) clearly establish that
their analysis is intended to understand the response of the
undamaged building to a fire, so that design-related conclu-
sions can be made. The other investigations lack a well-defined
objective and they are more directed towards providing
plausible reconstructions of the events. The NIST report
(Sunder et al., 2006) extracts conclusions on the different
vulnerabilities of the specific buildings and provides many
design recommendations. The recommendations appear as
general improvements to buildings of a similar nature but not
necessarily as consequences of the analysis. An excellent
example of this situation is the set of recommendations
associated with the dimensioning of egress stairs. The report
identified the extensive time associated with egress from such
tall buildings and concludes that improvements need to be
made to egress stairs. Nevertheless, it is not demonstrated that
these improvements would change the fate of the occupants of
the building (Sunder et al., 2006). If the objective had been to
establish why there were so many fatalities, clear conclusions
could have emerged, leading to improvements that could
potentially change the outcome.
Once the objectives of an investigation have been defined, the
main components of the fire strategy need to be addressed
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(Torero, 2006). Four aspects need to be considered when
conducting a forensic assessment of a building that has
undergone a fire:
(a) fire growth
(b) performance of protection systems
(c) egress analysis
(d) structural performance.
The event can only be described by the ensemble of these
factors leading to the construction of a timeline for the event.
Such a timeline has been presented by Torero (2006).
3.1 Fire growth
Fire growth is a complex combination of transport and chemical
processes. Materials degrade, producing fuel that will then burn
in the gas phase, generating heat. As the materials heat up the
fire spreads, increasing in size. These complex physical processes
can be modelled using different tools. Tools range from simple
close-form mathematical models to more complex computer
simulations. Computer simulations can vary in level of
complexity and the two best-known techniques are zone models
and CFD. The capabilities and limitations of these models are
described by Olenick and Carpenter (2003) who also compile a
list of the different tools available.
Analytical and zone models provide quantitative estimates of
temperatures and concentrations of different species. Nevertheless,
they cannot provide the spatial or time resolution necessary to
assess the performance of fire protection systems or structural
behaviour. Their advantage is their simplicity and capability to
produce estimates in reduced times.
For spatial and time resolution, it is necessary to resort to CFD
models. CFD models compute, on the basis of detailed input
parameters, the time and spatial evolution of temperature and
species. This information can then be used to reconstruct the
fire timeline and as an input variable for fire safety systems and
structural performance assessment. Comparison of the earlier
studies (FEMA, 2002; Quintiere et al., 2002; Usmani et al.,
2003) with the NIST report (Sunder et al., 2006) shows the
potential advantages of CFD tools.
Figure 2 shows an example of heat flux distributions on a
ceiling for a typical compartment fire. These heat flux
distributions evolve in time and are obtained by post-
processing CFD results using a numerical tool called FDS
(Jowsey et al., 2007). Given the nature of the system that is
being studied, this level of resolution might be necessary.
An issue of great concern is the capability of these tools to
provide a robust answer. There are inherent uncertainties in the
process of modelling a fire. Fuel quantity and distribution and
ventilation conditions can have a major impact on the
characteristics of a fire, as can the nature of the fuel materials
and the physical characteristics of the compartment. Given that
it is impossible to define the exact nature of fuel and ventilation,
the capability of models to establish a timeline for fire growth is
not clear. Furthermore, even if many of these parameters were
fixed, the choice of input properties still remains a very difficult
task. A blind round-robin of the modelling of two large-scale
experiments recently showed that even when most of the
conditions are well defined, the results are not necessarily
robust or consistent (Rein et al., 2007; 2009).
Given the limitations of models and the capability to provide
exact input parameters, fire reconstruction cannot rely on the
predictive capabilities of these tools. It is therefore necessary to
utilise models in a different manner. Simpler models can be
used to cover a parameter field and establish an understanding
of the range of conditions that could be present during a fire.
CFD models, which are more computationally intensive, can
be used to refine certain specific scenarios for analysis.
The reconstruction of the fires in the WTC investigation is
probably the most successful element of this analysis. The
NIST report (Sunder et al., 2006) uses an elegant combination
of CFD modelling with evidence (photographs) to supplement
lacking information in such a manner that at each step
consistency is guaranteed. Further consistency is attained by
means of analytical formulations and experiments conducted
with reproductions of the office floors. In a similar manner, the
phenomenological models described by Torero et al. (2002) are
used as a basis for the parametric studies of Usmani et al.
(2003). In this case, uncertainty is accounted for through a
parametric study. All these approaches are valid and necessary
for a complex scenario like the WTC.
3.2 Fire safety systems and egress
Fire safety systems are of two kinds – those intended to control
or affect fire growth and smoke migration (smoke manage-
ment, compartmentation and fire suppression) and those that
have no physical effect on the fire but are used to start the
process of egress (detection and alarm).
Fire suppression and detection systems have to be activated.
Activation has been modelled for both smoke detectors and
suppression systems, and numerical tools of different levels of
sophistication are available (Olenick and Carpenter, 2003).
These tools provide an adequate estimate of activation and are
generally reliable if the fire is a predefined input to the model.
Precision in activation times can only be equal to or less than the
precision in the fire model.
The performance of fire safety systems is a completely different
scenario; in general it cannot be modelled. Smoke detector
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performance is characterised by significant sources of error but
this is not an issue because the errors are smaller than the large
error bars associated with egress models and human behaviour.
Fire suppression systems are most difficult because they can
either have a large impact on the fire or almost no effect. There
is currently no model that can properly predict suppression
system performance. Fire suppression systems affect the fire in
its early stages and, if effective, will completely suppress the
fire. If the fire exceeds a specific level of growth the suppression
system will be overwhelmed and will only have a minor impact
on the fire. Given the two extremes, prediction of performance
might truly not be necessary. Detailed observation of the
evidence can allow clear definition of the performance of a
suppression system without the need to model it. If the
suppression system does not operate it is important to establish
the causes of the failure. Such failure is generally associated
with installation or maintenance errors and establishing these
errors requires intimate understanding of these systems.
Smoke management systems are also very difficult to analyse.
The efficiency of natural or forced smoke management systems
is directly dependent on the characteristics (temperature and
velocity) of the smoke. While this is very difficult to model and
any analysis will include a significant error, a simple
assessment of the system under design conditions is of great
use in forensic analysis. The presence of smoke leaves
observable traces and understanding smoke management
systems thus helps in the interpretation of these traces.
Compartmentation is also a form of smoke management; its
failure will be dealt with in the next section.
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Figure 2. Heat flux map over compartment ceiling from the model.
The number below each plot indicates the measured billet reading
at the black square at the corresponding time. The compartment
openings allowing for air to enter the compartment are located on
the right-hand side of each plot. Contour labels are in kW/m2 and
axis labels are room dimensions (in metres). (a) 10 min; (b) 20 min;
(c) 30 min; (d) 40 min
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Penetration of the building from the impact of the aircraft
defined ventilation and smoke movement in the WTC.
Analysis of the ventilation resulting from the observable
damage was used to estimate fire temperatures and localised
burning duration. Ventilation was addressed using CIB
(Conseil International du Baˆtiment) empirical correlations
(SFPE, 2004; Thomas and Heselden, 1972) by Torero et al.
(2002) and it was modelled explicitly by NIST (Sunder et al.,
2006). While both approaches differed in detail and precision
they were consistent in defining the duration of localised
burning and average temperatures of the fires. It is important
to emphasise that being a ‘ventilation-limited’ fire, both studies
conclude that the temperatures were not unusual for fires of
that magnitude. Furthermore, the role of the aircraft fuel was
deemed as being mostly related to ignition of the fires: the
kerosene evaporated rapidly and contributed little to the
heating of the structure. Average temperatures during
the entire extent of the fire were capped at about 1000 C˚ (Torero
et al., 2002) but most likely were never higher than 800 C˚
throughout most of the burning period (Sunder et al., 2006).
3.3 Structural behaviour
The behaviour of structures in a fire has evolved significantly
in the last decade (Usmani and Lamont, 2004). Many processes
previously not understood and mostly associated with thermal
expansion are now being modelled with significant precision.
The thermal inertia of a structure and the insulation used to
protect it result in structural heating times that are much
longer than the characteristic times that establish the evolution
of a fire. The difference in characteristic times tends to buffer
many of the uncertainties associated with the fire. Forensic
analysis of structures is thus becoming a reality.
For forensic modelling of structural behaviour in fire, the
parametric study described earlier (Usmani et al., 2003) can be
translated into a series of simple temperature plotted against time
and space curves that represent the range of most probable
conditions for the fire. As an example, Figures 3 and 4 show the
distributions used by Usmani et al. (2003) for their study of the
WTC towers. This temperature distribution covered all typical
fire conditions according to the earlier study of Torero et al.
(2002). The study focused on a parametric analysis and thus the
formulation of a series of ‘typical’ temperature histories
(Figure 4). Similarly, the size of the fire was also studied in a
parametric manner (Figure 3). The uncertainty is covered by the
range of cases studied and these temperature distributions were
thus deemed sufficient for the modelling of the structural
behaviour.
Once temperature evolutions have been established, FEMs of the
structure can be constructed. These models can allow an
investigator to establish the conditions under which certain features
can appear. Figure 5(a) shows a lower flange yield observed in the
Cardington tests (Usmani and Lamont, 2004). These tests showed
that these are low-temperature failures that occur early on in a fire.
The same type of feature appears in Figure 5(b), but this case is a
real fire where a steel frame shows similar features as those
presented in the Cardington tests. The modelling and identification
of such failures can provide further support towards the
reconstruction of a fire. Figure 6 shows how these features also
appeared in a scaled-down WTC unprotected truss.
Global structural behaviour needs to be approached in a
systematic manner. General behavioural trends can be established
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Figure 3. Spatial distribution of the temperature within a floor of
the WTC towers. Three scenarios are presented: the fully-heated
floor (A) and two levels of partial heating (B and C). T0 is the
ambient temperature and Tmax a pre-specified maximum value for
the compartment temperature (Usmani et al., 2003)
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Figure 4. Temporal evolution of the temperature of the WTC
compartment. Four heating rates are presented and the value of ’a’
corresponds to the exponential growth function T(t)5T0 + (Tmax2
T0)(12e
-at) postulated by Usmani et al., (2003) where t is time and
T0 and Tmax are defined in Figure 3
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when there are areas that could have a severe impact on the
structure. These areas tend to be those where major structural
elements are present. Long-span beams are also another feature
that needs to be looked at carefully. Once the areas of interest
have been established, there will be a number that can be
discarded because there is no possibility of a severe fire or the
evidence shows no permanent deformation of the structural
elements; for example, these could be areas with little fuel or
ventilation. Those that cannot be discarded need to be studied to
identify features that coincide with evidence.
Images obtained during the investigation of the WTC collapse
indicated that the columns initially showed outward bowing
but, close to collapse, the columns moved inwards until
collapse was observed. These features have been reproduced by
the models (Sunder et al., 2006; Usmani et al., 2003). The
simple one-dimensional model obtained by Usmani et al.
(2003) is presented in Figure 7. The sequence shows both the
local deformations and the observed global behaviour. Similar
deformations were observed by NIST (Sunder et al., 2006).
One of the most complicated features of structural fire
reconstruction is to create adequate timings for the different
observed events. The combination of the usual uncertainty in
insulation (or concrete spalling in the case of concrete
structures) and fire growth makes reproducing the time
sequence of events very difficult. The times presented in
Figure 7 cannot be considered as a faithful reproduction of the
timeline. The NIST report (Sunder et al., 2006) goes to great
lengths to reproduce the timeline. While this could be done for
Figure 6. Demonstration of a compartment fire with a scaled-
down WTC truss: (a) low-temperature lower flange buckling;
(b) high-temperature deformations (centenary). The truss was left
unprotected and the fire lasted for approximately 20 min
Figure 5. Lower flange buckling in (a) Cardington test and (b) a
real fire
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the fire because visual evidence allowed anchoring the
progression of the fire, uncertainty associated with the
structural timeline is great. Again, a parametric approach
seems to give the best results because it allows understanding
of the main behavioural patterns of the structure and their
association with the characteristics of the fire.
Failure of compartmentation is a complex process that couples
thermal and mechanical effects. So far, there is little precedent
of successful modelling of the failure of this type of structural
element. None of the WTC investigations addressed this issue
in detail despite its relevance to compromise of the egress
paths. The subject is discussed in one chapter of Rein et al.
(2007), but focuses on a specific type of wall assembly.
4. Summary
Modern buildings cannot rely on cause and origin analysis.
They require a fire reconstruction. Complete forensic analysis
of structures in fire is currently very difficult. Complex tools
(CFD and FEMs), together with other simpler tools such as
analytical formulations, experimental data and parametric
studies, are currently being used to attempt fire reconstruction.
The published investigations on the WTC collapse made
extensive use of all these tools in a manner that is
unprecedented and pushed the boundaries of the fire recon-
struction methods that existed prior to 11 September 2001.
Uncertainty can be found at all levels but is greatest in the
modelling of the fire. The large thermal inertia of structures
does not require a detailed understanding of the fire growth
and therefore the uncertainty can be compensated for with a
parametric analysis of the structure for a number of
representative (probable) fire scenarios. Contrasting the
different studies of the WTC allows analysis of the validity
of the different approaches and the adequacy of different
mechanisms to compensate for uncertainty (visual evidence,
parametric study).
Structural analysis is not only concerned with the global
behaviour of the building but also with the reproduction of
features that can be linked with specific characteristics of the
fire. Study of the WTC pushed existing understanding of
global structural behaviour but detailing of component failures
could not be addressed, despite their importance in terms of
egress.
An essential component of a fire investigation is its objective.
In the case of the WTC, these were poorly defined and this
conditioned the conclusions of the investigations.
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WHAT DO YOU THINK?
To discuss this paper, please email up to 500 words to the
editor at journals@ice.org.uk. Your contribution will be
forwarded to the author(s) for a reply and, if considered
appropriate by the editorial panel, will be published as
discussion in a future issue of the journal.
Proceedings journals rely entirely on contributions sent in
by civil engineering professionals, academics and stu-
dents. Papers should be 2000–5000 words long (briefing
papers should be 1000–2000 words long), with adequate
illustrations and references. You can submit your paper
online via www.icevirtuallibrary.com/content/journals,
where you will also find detailed author guidelines.
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